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New social and political movements from radically different
political positions are emerging across Europe using social
media, posing a new challenge to existing political parties
and structures. The Pirate Party in Germany and the Occupy
movement are examples of movements that have employed
social media to grow rapidly and create a significant political
and social impact – all in the last three years.
Beppe Grillo, the Italian comedian and blogger, is one 
of the first political figures to have embraced this change. 
He has used social media to communicate, recruit and
organise, growing the Moviment 5 Stelle from practically
nothing to a major political force in Italy in the space of 
three years, with it expected to play a crucial role in the 2013
Italian elections. His anti-establishment message has
resonated with many against a backdrop of declining trust in
political institutions, falling political party membership and
ever-lower voter turnout.
This report presents the results of a survey of 1,865
Facebook fans of Beppe Grillo and the Movimento 5 
Stelle. It includes data on who they are, what they think, 
and what motivates them to shift from virtual to real-world
activism. It also compares them with other similar parties in
Western Europe and their attitudes to those of the Italian
population. This report is the seventh in a series of country
specific briefings about the online support of populist 
parties across Europe.
Jamie Bartlett is Director of the Centre for the Analysis of
Social Media. Caterina Froio is a researcher at the European
University Institute, Florence. Mark Littler is an Associate of
Demos. Duncan McDonnell is a Marie Curie Fellow in the
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A note on terminology
9
This study concerns the Facebook supporters of Beppe Grillo
and his Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S – 5-Star Movement). It is
based on a survey of 1,865 Facebook fans of Grillo and the M5S.
Although the data set is drawn from supporters of both Grillo
and the M5S, we refer to them throughout this report as ‘Beppe
Grillo Facebook fans’. 
Where possible, we present this information within the
context of broader Italian society and make comparisons to
similar data on other non-mainstream parties in Western Europe,
as presented in the Demos report The New Face of Digital
Populism.1 By drawing such parallels, we are not claiming that the
M5S is a populist movement of the same type as those in that
report. Whether the M5S can and should be classified as
‘populist’ is not a concern of ours here. Rather, this comparison
is useful for us in understanding how – as a new political actor –
the movement is similar to, and differs from, other movements
and parties which challenge the establishment. 
In this paper, we are not concerned with what Beppe Grillo
Facebook fans think of the M5S and its internal organisation.
That is a topic for social movement and political party experts to
research and consider. We do not claim that the respondents of
this survey are representative of either the M5S’s official views, or
of voters. This sample consists of social media supporters of the
party. We are interested primarily in who these individuals are,
what motivates and concerns them, and how far their political
activism encompasses both offline and online engagement. 
Further papers by Demos looking at new political actors in
Europe will be released later in early 2013, including reports on
the Pirate Party in Germany and the Syriza Party in Greece. 
Throughout this paper, we also draw on European-wide
survey data from the autumn 2011 Eurobarometer survey and the
2008 European Values Study to make comparisons where
possible. These studies are cited where relevant below.
A note on terminology
Executive summary
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Changes in the way we communicate – from the Gutenberg
printing press to the first televised US presidential debate –
always have an effect on political parties and movements. The
internet is no different: analysts have long argued that mass
communication through the web would facilitate collective
action by bringing groups together around single issues,
lowering barriers to entry and thereby fundamentally changing
the nature of political movements.2 Social media – sometimes
called Web 2.0 – is now at the forefront of this change. More and
more of us live more of our social, professional and political lives
online. Facebook, Twitter, Google+ and LinkedIn are all
examples of the rapid transfer of people’s lives – interactions,
identities, arguments and views – onto a new kind of public
sphere, a vast digital social commons. Europeans spend an
average of four hours a day online, and have around 250 million
Facebook accounts.3
Inevitably, this is changing politics too. The size, diversity
and dynamism of social media platforms allow people to connect
and form social movements outside the existing political
channels far more quickly and easily than ever before. New social
movements are emerging using social media, and challenging
existing parties in a way unthinkable a decade ago. The English
Defence League in the UK, the Pirate Party in Germany, and the
Occupy movement are all examples of movements that have
employed social media to grow rapidly and create a significant
political and social impact – all in the last three years. 
At the same time, mainstream and established political
parties are beginning to recognise the power of social media.
Increasingly, most major political parties and movements have a
social media presence – blogs, Facebook pages, Twitter feeds –
that they use as an additional way to recruit new supporters,
release messages, respond to events, and in some instances even
to formulate policies. Such is the growth that the online social
media following of political parties on Facebook and elsewhere
for many of these groups often dwarfs their formal membership,
consisting of tens of thousands of sympathisers and supporters –
and is growing quickly.4 For example, the French Union pour un
Movement Populaire party has around 55,000 Facebook fans,
the UK Labour party has around 130,000 fans, and the Dutch
populist politicians Geert Wilders has over 200,000 followers.
The 2012 US election was dubbed the first ‘Facebook election’ as
the Democratic party invested millions of dollars in targeted
adverts and network analysis using social media platforms.5
This shift towards online political activism is taking place at a
time when formal party membership of Western European
political parties has been falling, almost universally, both in
absolute terms and (even more dramatically) relative to the size
of the electorate.6
This mélange of virtual and real-world political activity is
the way millions of people — especially young people — relate to
politics in the twenty-first century. This nascent, messy and more
ephemeral form of politics is becoming the norm for a younger,
digital generation: the MacArthur Research Network on Youth
and Participatory Politics found that 41 per cent of young
Americans engaged in at least one political act through social
media during the last 12 months.7 This is particularly significant
given that a growing number of people use social media as a
source of breaking news. According to a December 2011 survey
by the Pew Research Center, over 50 per cent of people learn
about breaking news via social media rather than official news
sources.8 Being part of a political social media group allows
people to be part of the movement, to connect with like-minded
people across the country and stay up to date with events at their
own speed – to interweave their political activism into their
social activities. Social media politics vary greatly, from single-
issue campaigns to established political party Facebook accounts
with strict control over the content. But they share in common
the idea of a direct, free and easy involvement (or disengage-
ment); regular updates and information; and active participation
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from members. This can help generate a sense of ‘virtual
belonging’ towards the specific online group enhanced also by
the possibility of interacting directly with like-minded people
from all over the world. 
Political parties of all shades increasingly recognise the
potential of social media to respond quickly to events – and even
to shape those events. With such low barriers to entry, recruiting
huge numbers of people is relatively easy, and can make
movements difficult to ignore. Indeed, some analysts argue that
the distinction between actions taken in ‘space’, and actions
taken in ‘cyberspace’, has become dissolved as social movement
theories have moved on from traditional media to social media.9
Grillo 
Beppe Grillo is one of the first politicians to have embraced this
transformational change, and by using social media as the
primary medium of communication, recruitment and
organisation, his movement has grown from practically nothing
to a major political force in Italy in the space of three years. The
creation of the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S – 5 Star Movement)
was announced by Grillo, then a popular Italian comedian and
blogger, in a blogpost dated 9 September 2009.10 It began: 
13
On 4 October 2009, a new National Five Star Movement will be born. It
will be born on the Internet. Italian citizens without a criminal record and
who are not members of any political party can join… the parties are dead. I
do not want to found ‘a party’, an apparatus, a structure of intermediation.
Rather I want to create a Movement with a programme.11
Grillo has repeated many times since then that he does not
want to create a political party, but rather a new movement that
changes the party political system in Italy, one that gives more
power to ordinary people – a new version of direct democracy.
Social media is central to this vision. Grillo has an enormous
social media following: almost one million people have joined
his Facebook page. Grillo tweets regularly and on 6 November
2012 had 700,556 followers. Generally, Italian parties have made
very poor use of internet and social media. For example (again as
of 6 November 2012) Nichi Vendola of the left-wing Sinistra
Ecologia Libertà (SEL – Left, Ecology and Freedom) has 236,436
followers, Pierluigi Bersani of the centre-left Partito Democratico
(PD – Democratic Party) has 146,088, Antonio di Pietro has
137,220, Pierferdinando Casini of the centrist Unione di Centro
(UDC – Union of the Centre) has 71,900, and Roberto Maroni
of the regionalist Lega Nord (LN – Northern League) has 5,676.
According to the ‘BlogItalia’ rankings, Grillo’s is by far the most
widely read blog in Italy and, according to Alexa, the 7,177th
most visited and viewed site in the world and the 159th in Italy.12
Grillo has used his internet presence and social media
network to raise issues and communicate his views on them,
arrange and advertise offline events, and foster discussion and
mobilise activity at grassroots level on those issues, for example
arranging piazza events, local meet-ups, demonstrations and
getting the vote out. Grillo has been able to transform this online
following and support into real world political impact.
Nationally, the M5S has consistently been placed second or third
in opinion polls since mid-2012, with up to 20 per cent of
respondents in surveys for most of the second half of the year
saying they would vote for the movement. Certainly, Grillo has
identified political themes that tap into the concerns of many
Italians – and made them mainstream: corruption, bribery,
sexual scandals and the politics of privileges and favours that he
argues has created the so called ‘Casta’ (caste). 
This study 
We believe it is profitable to understand the movement as a new
political actor, which works rather differently from parties, rather
than seeking to analyse it within the lenses used to examine
parties, an approach that inevitably ends by characterising the
M5S as a ‘dysfunctional party’.
Therefore, the survey data presented in this report were
collected in August 2012, by targeting the Facebook fans of a
number of Facebook groups deemed to be Grillo related (see the
annex for details). Facebook was selected because it is the most
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widespread and popular social media site in Italy. Members of
these groups were shown an advert inviting them to participate
in a survey, and on clicking the advert, individuals were
redirected to a survey that they were invited to complete. The
survey and adverts were presented in Italian, and were then
translated back into English for the purposes of this report.
In total, 2,245 people responded to our survey. Following
the removal of data that were either corrupt, intentionally
misleading or incomplete, a final data set of 1,865 survey
responses was produced. The results were weighted against the
groups’ online demographics available through Facebook’s
advertising tool. This was done in order to improve the validity
and accuracy of any inferences made about the online
population. Although online recruitment in social research is
widespread, self-select recruitment via social network sites brings
novel challenges. Because this is an innovative research method
with both strengths and weaknesses, we have included an in-
depth discussion of the methodology in the annex.
Results 
Age and demographics 
Overall, 63 per cent of Beppe Grillo Facebook fans are male and
37 per cent female – which tallies with existing research on the
subject. Beppe Grillo Facebook fans are also older than the
average Facebook user. There are 64 per cent of fans over the age
of 30, compared with 51 per cent of all Italian Facebook users. 
The educated unemployed 
Just over half of respondents – 54 per cent – said their highest
educational achievement was a high-school diploma (which is
above the Italian average of 34.8 per cent) This may reflect the
fact that – in general – those with higher education levels are
more likely to use the internet regularly for news and political
information. However, Grillo Facebook fans were more likely to
be unemployed than the average Italian citizen (19 per cent vs
7.9 per cent).
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Not just an internet group 
Around 20 per cent say they are ‘formal members of M5S’. When
asked about what sort of political activism they have or would
consider being involved with, it is striking how few Beppe Grillo
Facebook fans refused to rule out particular actions, compared
with the general population. For example, while 51 per cent of
Italians said they would ‘never’ participate in a boycott, only 9
per cent of Beppe Grillo Facebook fans expressed the same view.
A high proportion of respondents would not answer this
question, which suggests that those surveyed did not feel
comfortable talking about their offline political activities.
Economics and unemployment are the top concerns 
When asked to list their top two concerns from a list of 18, Beppe
Grillo Facebook fans were most likely to cite economic issues as
one of the top two. The economic situation (62 per cent) and
unemployment (61 per cent) are by far the two themes most
often selected, with taxation in third place (43 per cent) 
Generally positive towards immigration 
Respondents were also directly asked what they thought about
immigration. It appears that Beppe Grillo Facebook fans are
more likely than the general public to view immigration as an
opportunity (56 per cent compared with 28 per cent). It is of
note, however, that those under 30 were more likely to list
immigration as a top concern than those over 30. 
Pessimistic about Italy’s future
In general, Beppe Grillo Facebook fans were more likely than
the Italian public to be pessimistic about the future, across a
range of measures: 
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· 31 per cent thought their lives would be worse in 12 months,
compared with 18 per cent of the Italian public.
· 66 per cent thought the economic situation in Italy is going to
get worse, compared with 43 per cent of the Italian public. 
· 49 per cent thought the financial situation of their household is
going to get worse, compared with 24 per cent of the Italian
public 
· 78 per cent thought that things are going in the wrong direction
in Italy, compared with 65 per cent of the Italian public. 
· 70 per cent thought that things are going in the wrong direction
in the EU, compared with 40 per cent of the Italian public. 
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Highly dissatisfied with democracy and party politics in Italy 
The overwhelming majority (83 per cent) of respondents are not
at all satisfied with democracy in Italy, and just 4 per cent
express satisfaction. This is not surprising given Grillo’s
campaigning themes. Indeed, dissatisfaction in democracy in
Italy is high overall, which could suggest significant potential 
for further growth in Grillo’s support. Further, when asked in an
open question why they support Grillo, supporters say they do
so because of disillusionment with the main parties or wanting
change (41 per cent of respondents) or because they adhere to
the values of the movement (28 per cent). According to
respondents, the problems that drive their support for the 
M5S are the Italian parties and the Italian political system, 
less so the broader idea of ‘democracy’ and ‘representation’.
Overall, their support is strictly related to the idea of 
‘changing’ the system, the ruling elites and the traditional ways
of making policy. 
Supporters tend to be left of centre 
We asked respondents to position themselves on the political
spectrum ranging from 1 to 10, with 1 being furthest left and 10
furthest right. The average score for respondents was 3.88,
suggesting Beppe Grillo Facebook fans consider themselves to
be generally left of centre. In our sample, 23 per cent said they
voted for the Italia dei Valori (IDV – Italy of Values) and 22 per
cent for the PD at the 2008 general election. That said, a
significant share (13 per cent) of our respondents also voted for
the PDL, while 5 per cent had supported the Lega Nord. The
remaining 25 per cent were either not old enough to vote in 2008
or had abstained. 
Trust in political and social institutions low 
Consistent with the anti-establishment rhetoric of the M5S and
Grillo, less than 20 per cent trust the European Union; only 8
per cent trust the government; 3 per cent trust political parties;
and 2 per cent trust parliament. The organisations seen as being
at the heart of the financial crisis are especially mistrusted: just 2
per cent trust banks and financial institutions, and 6 per cent
trust big companies. These proportions are lower, on every
measure, than those for the Italian general public. 
Trust in the internet and small and medium sized enterprises is high 
The only two institutions, organisations and media outlets that
command the trust of over half the respondents are the internet
(76 per cent) and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs)
(61 per cent). The internet score is in stark contrast to the low
levels of trust in other media. Only 11 per cent trust the press
(compared with 34 per cent of Italians overall) and less than 4
per cent trust television (compared with 40 per cent of Italians
overall). Given Grillo’s long-running and vehement criticism of
traditional Italian media, these results do not seem surprising. 
Implications 
Grillo has tapped into major concerns about the way politics is
being conducted in Italy. By standing on an anti-establishment
platform, and using modern communications, he has combined
medium and message to create a genuinely novel type of move-
ment. Grillo’s remarkable success shows the effectiveness of
communicating and organising through the internet – and the
potential that has to speak directly to millions of people:
especially those who are disenchanted with existing political
structures. 
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But the implications of Grillo’s success extend far beyond
Italy. Many of the concerns of Grillo’s supporters are shared by
people across Europe. Over the last decade, trust in the EU and
national governments and parliament has been on a downward
trend across the continent. In 2002, 39 per cent of Europeans
trusted national government and 42 per cent trusted parliament
while in 2012 only 28 per cent do so.13 That, combined with
falling party membership and voter turnout, suggests that the
appeal of movements like M5S – which combine an anti-
establishment rhetoric with smart ways of using modern media –
could grow across Europe. 
Of course, social media is only part of the story. Grillo’s
success also demonstrates that communicating and organising
through the internet is not a substitute for real-world political
activism, rather something that can facilitate it. The M5S also
acts locally, and its strength appears to be the way it combines
online and offline activism effectively. The ‘meet-ups’, made up
of people who gather and meet offline in their local communities
every week or so, are critical for the movement’s success: they
often drive the debates and discussions, for example reviewing
the extent to which city councils or regional governments are
performing. Grillo himself recognises that online campaigning is
not enough; he is very active with rallies across the country,
which attract large numbers of people and media coverage. It is
the interaction of traditional, offline political activism and new
ways to communicate and organise that activism that has been so
transformative. 
Social media politics also presents challenges to policy-
making and political systems. For example, social media
campaigning tends to benefit those who are active and skilled at
social media use, and they are not always representative of the
population as a whole. Moreover, as more political parties begin
to use social media for political and policy purposes, this could
become a new site for lobbying and campaigning – which might
have a detrimental effect on use of social media as a site for open,
free exchange and information sharing.14 Online movements with
a broad supporter base are also less able to be disciplined to
19
follow a single party line, with potentially unpredictable
consequences for the leaders of those movements. 
Nevertheless, Grillo and the M5S are responding to the
concerns of Italians (and Europeans more generally) and using
modern communications effectively to do so. His remarkable
success demonstrates an appetite for change. Mainstream parties
would do well to take the movement seriously, understand what
is driving the concerns of supporters, and respond to the
challenges the movement has presented, as well as learning from
the success it has so far enjoyed.
Executive summary
1 Background 
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As one of Italy’s best known comedians, Beppe Grillo had often
exposed political and business scandals as part of his routines,
but in 2005 he published his first post on his blog,
www.beppegrillo.it, which established him as a public figure
focusing primarily on political and societal issues. In the ensuing
years, this became the most visited political blog in Italy and was
the launching pad for other online and offline initiatives.
Through the blog, Grillo encouraged readers to organise offline
using meetup.com and discuss the topics he raised in his blog.
Beppe Grillo meet-ups were quickly established all over Italy. As
of 8 November 2012, there were officially 532 Grillo meet-up
groups, containing 87,895 members and spanning 446 cities and
12 countries (although they were mainly based in Italy).15 In
2007, Grillo organised an event called ‘V-Day’, which brought
the movement to a much wider media and audience. V-day, as
Grillo explained in his blog, was short for ‘Vaffanculo day’
(‘Fuck-off day’), a message directed in particular towards Italy’s
party political class.16 The event’s main objectives were to
campaign for a ban on politicians with a criminal record serving
in Parliament, prohibiting parliamentarians from serving more
than two terms, and a return to an electoral system which would
allow citizens to choose their representatives (rather than the
closed lists system introduced in 2005). V-day events took place
in approximately 200 squares across Italy, with the largest –
featuring Grillo – in Bologna.17 Following this success, Italian
television and press devoted considerable coverage to Grillo,
with much commentary seeking to dismiss him as ‘anti-political’.
The second V-day took place on 25 April 2008, focusing on
freedom of information, a referendum removing public subsidies
for newspapers, and making it easier to get permission for new
publications. 
The success of these events, along with that of the blog and
the meet-ups, inevitably led to questions about whether (and
how) Grillo and his supporters would interact with formal
politics. This was an issue of some contention inside the meet-
ups, with some activists calling for no participation in electoral
politics, some suggesting using civic lists, and others supporting
cooperation with existing parties (in particular, the Italia dei
Valori party). In a few cases candidates standing for Italia dei
Valori were also supported by Grillo, but over time the most
common solution agreed on was that of Grillo-sponsored lists
running independently. This happened in eight cities in the 
2008 local elections, where candidates were endorsed on the
basis that they:
Background
· did not belong to any party
· had never received a criminal sentence
· promised not to serve more than one term in office
· resided in the constituency where they stood for election
These candidates ran under the banner ‘amici di Beppe
Grillo’ (‘friends of Beppe Grillo’). A section of Grillo’s website
was created to certify and publicise such lists and Grillo took
part in local campaign events. However, while some of these
candidates did manage to get elected as councillors, none gained
over 4 per cent. Nevertheless the supporters, followers and
friends of Beppe Grillo kept growing, along with his desire to
‘conquer’ and change Italian politics. 
This success led to the founding of the M5S movement in
2009. The conditions for joining the M5S were (and still are)
based on the ‘Non-Statute’, a document produced in December
2009 and published on Grillo’s website, which contains seven
articles setting out some of the main rules of the movement and
basic information. The Non-Statute also states some of the
objectives and rationale underpinning the creation of the M5S.
For example, article 4 states that the movement aims to build on
the experiences of the blog, the meet-ups, the large-scale events,
other public initiatives and the lists presented in the 2008 and
2009 local elections.18
The 2010 regional elections were a moderate success, with
the M5S most notably receiving circa 6–7 per cent and electing
two councillors in Emilia-Romagna (in the centre-north) and
Piedmont (in the north-west). Indeed, in the latter case, the M5S
took enough support from the outgoing centre-left regional
president to swing the vote in favour of the centre-right
candidate. In the 2011 local elections the proportion of M5S
votes improved further, and the movement obtained around 10
per cent in some areas of north-central and north-western Italy. 
It was at the 2012 round of local elections, however, when the
M5S really leapt forward electorally.19 Confounding expecta-
tions, in those constituencies in which it stood in the north and
centre-north, it received well over 10 per cent of the vote. In
Genoa, its candidate reached the second round mayoral election
run-off, while in Parma, Federico Pizzarotti of the M5S became
mayor. Although the movement extended its presence by
increasing candidates and city councillors across the north, the
same did not occur to anything like the same extent in the south
– something which many commentators identified as a weakness,
suggesting that the M5S was likely to find it hard to break
through in the supposedly less ‘civic’ southern areas, where
voting logics have traditionally been based more on patronage
and ties to candidates.20
These predictions are being confounded by the M5S’s rise
in national opinion polls and the movement’s performance in the
Sicilian regional elections on 28 October 2012. In an IPSOS
survey conducted on 10 April 2012, 5 per cent of respondents
said that they would vote for the M5S.21 Just two months later,
another IPSOS survey, conducted on 11 June, found that 20.6
per cent would vote for the M5S.22 This put it in second place in
the polls, after the centre-left Partito Democratico (PD –
Democratic Party) and ahead of Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-right
Popolo della Libertà (PDL – Party of Freedom). Nonetheless, in
mid-October 2012, pollsters were predicting that the M5S
candidate in Sicily would secure little more than 5 per cent in the
upcoming regional elections on the island. Grillo’s unconven-
tional approach to campaigning, however, appears to have
dramatically improved the party’s fortunes: Grillo swam to Sicily
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from Calabria before embarking on a series of rallies in piazzas
attended by thousands of Sicilians (although these events were
mostly ignored by Italian television). The M5S candidate for
regional president Giovanni Cancelleri subsequently secured 18.2
per cent (and third place), while the M5S, with 14.9 per cent of
the council chamber vote, finished ahead of all other lists,
including those of the PD and PDL.
Movement organisation and leadership
Grillo stated from the beginning that he did not want to found ‘a
party’; the M5S continues to reject this label and calls itself a
‘movement’. There is a strong link between the movement and its
founder, which is affirmed in several places in the Non-Statute.
For example, article 3 states that Grillo is the only holder of the
right to use the name ‘Movimento 5 Stelle’, while article 1 says ‘the
headquarters of the ‘5-Star Movement’ is the web address
www.beppegrillo.it’ and that ‘contacts with the movement
should only take place via the email address MoVimento5stelle@
beppegrillo.it’. In this sense, the M5S seems to have some
similarities with a franchise – the label ‘Movimento Cinque
Stelle’ remains the property of Grillo alone and only he can
decide – on a case-by-case basis – who may use it for political (or
any other) purposes. This is re-emphasised in article 7, which
says that the M5S gathers candidatures and decides who ‘will be
authorised to use the name and brand “Movimento 5 Stelle”
when competing in any election’.
In recent months, Italy’s mainstream press and television
media – which tends to be very critical and/or dismissive of the
M5S – has devoted a lot of attention to internal democracy in the
movement and the leadership. In particular, the media focused
on an off-camera remark (which was nonetheless recorded and
broadcast) by a M5S regional councillor in Emilia-Romagna,
Giovanni Favia, about the lack of democracy in the M5S and the
role of Gianroberto Casaleggio – an ‘internet strategies expert’
who is Grillo’s key adviser.23 Casaleggio’s lack of public profile
and visibility compared with Grillo has allowed the media to
paint him as a shadowy figure controlling the movement from
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behind the scenes. However, Casaleggio himself has been very
open about his involvement. In a letter to the Corriere della Sera
on 30 May 2012, he said that he had planned the blog
www.beppegrillo.it with Grillo, along with the two V-days.
Defining himself as ‘effectively the co-founder with Grillo of this
Movement’, he added that he and Grillo had written the ‘Non-
Statute’ together.24 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the issue
of internal democracy has been present since the beginning; a
small number of the meet-up groups, for example, have
requested increases in the internal democratic procedures of the
group, such as how candidates are selected.25
Another source of recent contention within the M5S –
which the media has again devoted considerable attention to – is
whether its representatives should appear on television, particu-
larly transmissions discussing politics. When the Bologna City
councillor Federica Salsi participated in the RAI 3 state television
Ballarò talk show on 29 October 2012, the following day, Grillo
– without naming her – published a post on his blog condemn-
ing those from the M5S who went on television as essentially just
doing so for their own ego and damaging the movement in the
process.26 In another blog post on 6 November, Grillo added
that while television interviews with M5S elected representatives
are not currently prohibited, ‘their participation in talk shows is
strongly discouraged and in future will be banned’.27
Many media outlets have suggested, based on these
incidents, that the M5S is an undemocratic movement, utterly
controlled by Grillo and Casaleggio. We pass no judgement on
this point. It does seem worth noting that an often-repeated
statement by M5S activists and elected representatives is, as the
mayor of Parma Pizzarotti, put it: ‘Grillo is our megaphone,
rather than the official leader.’28 Grillo himself has said many
times that he has no intention of standing for elected office. 
Key issues
The five ‘stars’ of the M5S represent five of its main themes:
public water, transportation, development, internet connection
and availability, and the environment). The goals and key issues
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of the movement are explained in further detail in its pro-
gramme, published on Grillo’s website.29 This document is 15
pages long and is divided into seven sections, on state and
citizens, energy, information, economy, transport, health and
education. The two longest parts concern energy and health
(each three pages). Many of the proposals in the programme
focus on political reform and reducing the costs of politics,
increasing access to internet and broadband coverage, boosting
government transparency at all levels, enhancing the pluralism of
information, improving the free market, safeguarding universal
health care, protecting the environment and promoting
sustainable development. There is not the space here to go
through each individual proposal, but a few of those which we
consider most significant and representative are listed below:
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· abolition of election campaign reimbursements for political
parties
· two-term limit for all publicly-elected representatives
· citizens with a criminal record not able to stand for election
· MPs’ salaries to be reduced to average national wage level
· laws to be published online three months before their approval
in order to allow the public to comment on them
· elimination of public subsidies for newspapers
· limit of 10 per cent maximum single shareholding in national
television stations and national daily newspapers
· state broadcaster to be reduced from three national channels to
just one, which will not carry advertising and be free from party
influence
· abolition of monopolies enjoyed by the national motorway
company, Telecom Italia, and the companies ENI and Enel in
the energy market
· guaranteed unemployment benefit (at present, this is not the
case for all those who lose their jobs in Italy)
· adherence to Kyoto protocols
· congestion charges for single-occupant cars in cities
· banning of incinerators
· provision of free Italian lessons for foreigners (obligatory for
foreigners who have applied for Italian citizenship)
While it is certainly not true (as some have claimed) that
the M5S does not have a programme, there are a number of areas
not covered in the document. For example, other than the
provision of Italian lessons, it says nothing about immigration.
Likewise, there is nothing about foreign policy or ethical
questions (such as civil unions – an issue which has been a
source of controversy in Italy). There is also nothing in the
document about the EU, although Grillo has often expressed
criticism of the EU bureaucracy and the Euro. On 6 November
2012, Grillo wrote on his blog that ‘the decision whether to
remain in the Euro should be taken by Italian citizens via a
referendum. I believe that Italy cannot afford the luxury of being
in the Euro, but it should be the Italians who decide this and not
a group of oligarchs or Beppe Grillo.’30 Similarly, no explicit
reference is made in the programme to the crisis and to the
austerity measures. Indeed, the part of the programme on the
economy only takes up two pages. This may reflect the
provisional nature of the document, given that – in Grillo’s
speeches and blog posts – he takes a very strong position against
austerity and the actions of the Monti government.
Who votes for and supports the M5S?
In the absence of research on what it means to be a grassroots
member of the M5S or what that participation actually consists
of, it is very difficult to discuss the organisation at local level.
Based on the data available on the web pages of individual meet-
ups, it seems that only a small fraction of the listed supporters
regularly meets offline to discuss the impact of the issues raised
on Grillo’s blog on their communities. That said, there is clearly
a hard core of activists who do meet at least several times per
month in cities across Italy, scrutinising decisions made by local
city councils and, where appropriate, opposing them and
proposing alternatives. This seems worth noting, especially given
the lack of grassroots presence and activity in some of Italy’s
major political parties.31
Considering the remarkable speed of M5S’s growth, the
profile of M5S voters is hard to examine with any confidence –
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however, some evidence does shed light. As a forthcoming study
shows, in surveys conducted in October and December 2011,
when asked to place themselves on a 1–5 ‘left-right’ scale, the
average M5S voter was located around 2.32 This was to the left of
Italia dei Valori voters, but to the right of voters of the main
centre-left party, the Partito Democratico. This situation is likely
to have changed considerably over the past year. In a recent
article, analysts Fabio Bordignon and Luigi Ceccarini find that
now the percentage of M5S voters placing themselves on the
centre-left or left is 32 per cent (down from 48 per cent at the end
of 2010), while those placing themselves on the centre-right or
right has risen since the end of 2010 from 11 per cent to 28 per
cent.33 According to an ISPO survey, over 30 per cent of those
who voted for the M5S in the 2012 local elections had abstained
in the 2008 general election.34 Bordignon and Ceccarini found
that 60 per cent of the M5S electorate was male, while the
percentage of voters over 45 (previously around 30 per cent) at
the 2012 local elections rose to 45 per cent. They noted that this
is still a significantly lower figure than the national average of
people voting (57 per cent).35
Geographically, the M5S did best in central-northern and
northern areas in the 2012 local elections, but given its growth in
the opinion polls and performance in the Sicilian regional
elections, it now appears to enjoy widespread support across the
country. Interestingly, the Italian researcher Nicola Maggini has
recently investigated the potential of the movement to grow,
through a survey of 3,000 people in May 2012.36 He found that
the potential electorate of the M5S – from both centre-left and
centre-right – tended to be far more concerned (than those who
were not potential voters) about environmental issues. They were
also more in favour of granting Italian citizenship to children
born in Italy to immigrant parents, and more liberal on ethical
questions such as abortion and civil unions. The main divide
between centre-right and centre-left potential M5S voters
concerned a broad range of socio-economic issues, such as the
freedom to hire and fire.37
Background
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Grillo’s Facebook supporters 
This chapter presents the socio-economic characteristics, age and
gender data regarding the 1,865 Beppe Grillo Facebook
supporters surveyed in August 2012. Before discussing the
results, it is worth recalling the context in which the survey took
place. As discussed above, by the end of the summer of 2012, the
M5S had risen in the space of just a few months from 5 per cent
in the polls to between 18 per cent and 20 per cent. The
technocratic government led by Mario Monti, supported by the
main parties of the centre-right and centre-left, was coming
towards the end of its first year in power. The Monti govern-
ment’s popularity had declined considerably, but mainstream
parties had failed to regain public trust, which remained at
extremely low levels for both political parties and parliament.
Where data allow, we compare the survey results to the
Italian general public, and occasionally make comparisons to
other non-mainstream parties in Western Europe, as presented in
the Demos report The New Face of Digital Populism.38 We do not
make the argument that the Movimento 5 Stelle is analogous to
those in that report. Rather, this comparison is useful for us in
understanding how – as a new political actor – the composition
of Beppe Grillo Facebook supporters as a group compares with
those we have found among other European movements and
parties that challenge the establishment. 
Using Facebook’s publicly available advertising tool, it is
possible to identify the age and the gender of all Italian users of
Facebook, as well as the basic demographic information of Face-
book users who follow sites linked to Beppe Grillo and the M5S.
Across the country as a whole, Italian Facebook users are
slightly more likely to be male than female (54 per cent vs 46 per
cent, n = 20,731,520). Overall, 63 per cent of Beppe Grillo
Facebook fans are male and 37 per cent female – the gender split
tallies almost exactly with that found among M5S voters at the
2012 local elections.39 Beppe Grillo Facebook fans are also older
than the average Facebook user (table 1). Nearly two-thirds (64
per cent) are over the age of 30, compared with 51 per cent of all
Italian Facebook users. This is slightly surprising given
Bordignon and Ceccarini’s finding cited in the previous chapter
that the average M5S voter tends to be younger than those of
other parties, although it may reflect differences between M5S
voters and Beppe Grillo Facebook fans and/or changes in the
composition of supporters in the months following the local
elections. Given the rise of the M5S in those months, this latter
option seems plausible.
Table 1 The age of Beppe Grillo Facebook Fans (n = 911,000)
(national statistics in brackets)
Age group Beppe Grillo Facebook fans 
(Italy total) (%)
16–20 6 (18)
21–25 13 (17)
26–30 17 (14)
31–40 30 (25)
41–50 22 (16)
51+ 12 (10)
Participants were also asked what city they lived closest to.
It is important to stress that this is just a general overview of
location, and we cannot distinguish between those who live in
the city, and those in the countryside. Of our respondents, 19 per
cent said they lived closest to Milan; 17 per cent were closest to
Rome; 11 per cent lived closest to Naples; 9 per cent lived closest
to Turin or Bologna; 8 per cent lived closest to Florence; and 7
per cent were closest to Venice. 
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Education and employment
We asked respondents about their highest level of education and
current employment status (table 2). The proportion of Beppe
Grillo Facebook fans with a high-school diploma was 54 per
cent. This may reflect the digital divide in Italy: in general those
with higher education levels are more likely to use the internet
regularly for news and political information.
Table 2 The highest educational attainment of Beppe Grillo
Facebook fans (n = 1,865) (national statistics in brackets)
Total (%)
Primary school diploma 1 (21.6) 
Middle school diploma 18 (32) 
High-school diploma 54 (34.8) 
University degree 27 (11.7)40
We also asked respondents about their current employment
status (table 3). Beppe Grillo Facebook fans were more likely to
be unemployed than the average Italian citizen (19 per cent vs
7.9 per cent). Only 18 per cent of respondents were classified as
students. This is surprising given that M5S voters have generally
been considered younger than average and with higher
education levels. It is far lower, for example, than the equivalent
figure for Facebook fans of the Pirate Party in Germany, of
whom students make up 36.3 per cent.41
Table 3 The employment status of Beppe Grillo Facebook fans
(national statistics in brackets)42
Total (%)
Employed 50 (61.2)
Unemployed 19 (7.9)
Part time 9 [not available]
Student 18 (2.9)
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Membership and involvement
We asked respondents whether they were ‘formal’ members of
the M5S (table 4). In our sample, 80 per cent of the respondents
do not define themselves as formal members of the movement
and this proportion is higher among respondents aged over 30
(92 per cent).
This seemingly low figure may be because the M5S has a
‘liquid structure’ and portrays itself as an unconventional
political group. Therefore understandings of what constitutes a
‘formal member’ may be different in the case of the M5S than it
is in traditional political parties. This is especially so since the
M5S openly refuses conventional forms and labels of political
participation. Interestingly, in the case of the Pirate Party in
Germany, a similar percentage of respondents (28 per cent) were
prepared to say that they were a ‘formal member’.43 It is also
worth noting that the comparative figure for those parties
studied in the ‘Digital Populism’ series was not much higher:
only 32 per cent of respondents in that survey said they were
formal members of the party or group.
Table 4 Whether Beppe Grillo Facebook fans are formal members
of the M5S, by age 
Under 30 (%) Over 30 (%) Total (%)
Yes 24 8 19
No 76 92 80
The M5S is one of a number of new types of political
movements that use social media to arrange offline activities. We
therefore asked respondents about the extent of their political
activism (not necessarily M5S related) over the past six months
(table 5).44
Even if it is difficult to make a direct comparison with the
Italian general public because of the large number of people
who did not answer the question, we can see that among those
who did answer, there is a fairly high degree of willingness to
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contemplate the various actions listed: ‘might do’ is consistently
the highest category selected. 
Table 5 The extent of political activism of Beppe Grillo Facebook
fans in past six months (national statistics in brackets)
Have Might Would Don’t Did not
done do never know answer this
do question
Signing a petition 47 (51) 10 (33) 1 (17) 3 (3) 39 (1)
Joining in boycotts 7 (12) 22 (38) 9 (51) 6 (5) 56 (2)
Participate in 
unauthorised strikes 4 (8) 12 (15) 10 (78) 10 (3) 66 (2)
Occupying buildings 
or factories 2 (9) 17 (18) 17 (72) 17 (5) 47 (2)
Likewise, it is striking how few Beppe Grillo Facebook fans
refused to rule out particular actions compared with the general
population. For example, while 51 per cent of Italians said they
would ‘never’ participate in a boycott, only 9 per cent of Beppe
Grillo Facebook fans expressed the same view. The high degree
of non-response rate suggests that those surveyed did not feel
comfortable talking about their offline political activities.
Top two concerns
When asked to rank their social and political concerns from a list
of 18 current issues, Beppe Grillo Facebook fans were most likely
to cite economic issues as one of the top two (table 6). The
economic situation (62 per cent) and unemployment (61 per
cent) are by far the two themes most often mentioned: almost 20
points separate these from the third-place issue, taxation. Unlike
the right-wing populist movements researched in the Digital
Populism project, immigration (in 12th position) is not a key
concern for Beppe Grillo Facebook Fans, but it is not negligible
either, given that almost 20 per cent of respondents mention it.
This may partly reflect the different political backgrounds of
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M5S supporters, especially the increase in 2012 of former voters
of the Lega Nord and the PDL. 
It is interesting to note here the difference between those
under 30 who are concerned about immigration (24 per cent)
and those above 30 who agree (16 per cent).
Table 6 The top two biggest concerns of Beppe Grillo Facebook
fans, by age
Total Under 30 Over 30
(%) (%) (%)
Economic situation 62 56 67
Unemployment 61 63 60
Taxation 43 38 47
Rising prices and inflation 36 28 32
Education 33 41 26
Environment 33 37 31
The educational system 33 41 26
Crime 31 35 28
Energy 29 35 25
Healthcare system 29 34 26
Pensions 23 23 24
Immigration 20 24 16
Housing 16 22 12
Terrorism 15 21 10
Defence and foreign affairs 13 18 10
We asked respondents directly what they thought about
immigration (table 7). Beppe Grillo Facebook fans are more
likely to view immigration as an opportunity (56 per cent) than
as a problem (39 per cent), and there is a higher proportion of
them than among the national public with this view (56 per cent
compared with 28 per cent). 
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Table 7 Whether Beppe Grillo Facebook fans think that
immigration is a problem or an opportunity for Italy
(national statistics in brackets)
(%)
Immigration is more of a problem for Italy 39 (48)
Immigration is more of an opportunity for Italy 56 (28)
Expectations for the future 
We asked respondents a series of questions about the extent to
which they were optimistic or pessimistic about their future, and
that of Italy (table 8). In general, Beppe Grillo Facebook fans
were more likely than the Italian public to think that their
personal situation would change either for the better or for the
worse. Only 26 per cent think that the situation will remain the
same, compared with 55 per cent of the Italian public. More
specifically, one-third of Beppe Grillo Facebook fans thought
their life would be worse, while less than a third (27 per cent)
thought it would improve. 
Beppe Grillo Facebook fans are substantially more
pessimistic than the Italian public concerning the economic
situation in Italy (66 per cent vs 43 per cent among the Italian
public) and the financial situation of their household (49 per
cent vs 24 per cent among the Italian public). In general,
respondents over the age of 30 are more pessimistic than those
under 30 concerning their life in general (40 per cent over 30 are
pessimistic vs only 20 per cent among the under-30s), the
economic situation in Italy (68 per cent vs 63 per cent) and the
financial situation of their households (54 per cent vs 44 per
cent). 
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Table 8 Whether Beppe Grillo Facebook fans expect their lives in
general, the economic situation in Italy and the financial
situation in their households in the next 12 months to be
better, worse or the same, by age (national statistics in
brackets)
Your life in general Under 30 (%) Over 30 (%) Total (%)
Better 40 16 27 (19)
Worse 20 40 31 (18)
Same 23 28 26 (55)
Did not answer (D/k) 11 (8)
The economic situation Under 30 (%) Over 30 (%) Total (%)
in Italy
Better 13 7 10 (21)
Worse 63 68 66 (43)
Same 10 15 13 (30)
Did not answer (D/k) 5 (6)
The financial situation Under 30 (%) Over 30 (%) Total (%)
of your household
Better 11 9 10 (16)
Worse 44 54 49 (24)
Same 27 24 25 (54)
Did not answer (D/k) 10 (6)
We asked respondents about the extent to which they were
satisfied with the current state of democracy in Italy (table 9).
The results show that the overwhelmingly majority (83 per cent)
are not at all satisfied. Just 4 per cent express satisfaction. This is
not surprising since the M5S bases part of its appeal on its
opposition to the current set-up and actors of Italian democracy.
As we have seen, Grillo has for many years identified the parties
and traditional media (television and newspapers) as the major
culprits of this dysfunctional political system. Generally, faith in
the institutions and agents of democracy has declined
considerably in Italy over the past year. This has become
particularly evident since the fall of the PDL-LN government in
November 2011 and its replacement by Mario Monti’s
technocratic government.45 In a survey published in La
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Repubblica in early January 2012, only 3.9 per cent expressed
‘faith’ in the parties and 8.9 per cent in parliament.46 A survey by
ISPO and Corriere della Sera at the beginning of February 2012
produced similar results, with 91 per cent of respondents saying
they had ‘little’ or ‘very little’ faith in political parties.47 Likewise,
turnout in second-order elections has also noticeably declined
(this was down 7 percentage points in the 2012 local elections
compared with 2007, the last time the same cities voted).
A recent survey by Demopolis48 showed that the roots of
Grillo’s support can, to some extent, be found in public feelings
of disenchantment towards traditional parties: 28 per cent of
those who voted for the M5S at the 2012 local elections
explained that they did so because they did not feel represented
by the traditional parties. Moreover, 43 per cent of respondents
declared that they voted for the M5S in order to radically change
the political class.
Table 9 The extent to which Beppe Grillo Facebook fans are
satisfied with the way democracy is developing in Italy,
by age (national statistics in brackets)49
Under 30 (%) Over 30 (%) Total (%)
Very satisfied 1 2 2 (2)
Somewhat satisfied 3 2 2 (30)
Not very satisfied 11 10 10 (49)
Not at all satisfied 82 84 83 (19)
I do not know 1 <1 <1 (5)
More broadly, we asked respondents whether they thought
– in general – things were moving in the right direction in Italy,
and in the European Union. In table 10 we compare these data
with those of the autumn 2011 Eurobarometer (the most recently
available data set). 
Nearly eight out of ten people (78 per cent) surveyed felt
that things were going in the wrong direction in Italy (compared
with 65 per cent of the population in general). Seven out of ten
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(70 per cent) felt that things were going in the wrong direction in
the EU. Although these views are slightly less pessimistic than
they are over the question regarding Italy, they are still 30
percentage points higher than the Italian national average (albeit
recorded in 2010) of 40 per cent. Given Grillo’s criticisms not
just of Italian democracy and politics, but also of democracy and
politics at European supranational level, these results do not
seem surprising to us.
Table 10 Whether Beppe Grillo Facebook fans think that things are
going in the right direction in Italy and the European
Union (national statistics in brackets)50
Right Wrong Neither Don’t 
direction direction know
Italy 6 (8) 78 (65) 12 (21) 1 (6)
The European Union 7 (25) 70 (40) 13 (26) 4 (9)
Political positioning 
We asked respondents to position themselves on the political
spectrum ranging from 1 to 10, with 1 being furthest left and 10
furthest right (table 11). The average score for respondents was
3.88, suggesting Beppe Grillo Facebook fans consider themselves
to be generally left of centre. This is broadly in line with the
findings of Ceccarini, Diamanti and Lazar cited in the opening
chapter; they found M5S supporters to be around ‘2’ on a 1–5
left–right scale.51
We also asked Beppe Grillo Facebook fans which party
they voted for at the last general election in 2008 (when the M5S
did not run) (table 12). In our sample, 23 per cent said they
voted for the party led by former anti-corruption magistrate
Antonio Di Pietro, Italia dei Valori (IDV – Italy of Values), and
21.6 per cent voted for the PD. These two parties ran together in
the 2008 general election. The share for IDV is well above that
party’s overall result in 2008 of 4.4 per cent and indicates that
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the IDV and the M5S have a similar appeal for Beppe Grillo
Facebook fans. It is also far higher than the share of former IDV
voters found in an IPSO study in early May 201253 (3.6 per cent).
Although it is important to remember that our survey concerns
Facebook fans and not voters, this disparity between the May
figure and our results suggests that many of those who have
switched to the M5S in opinion polls over the summer are likely
to be coming from IDV. 
It is worth noting, however, that a significant share of our
respondents also voted for the PDL (13 per cent), while 5 per
cent had supported the Lega Nord. The remaining 25 per cent
were either not old enough to vote in 2008 or abstained. 
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Table 11 Where Beppe Grillo Facebook fans position themselves
on a political spectrum (national statistics in brackets)52
Left
1 2 3 4 5
16.6 (8.0) 11.8 (5.0) 16.6 (11.7) 9.6 (10.8) 19.8 (21.4)
Right
6 7 8 9 10
6.6 (12.8) 3.9 (9.4) 2.0 (10.2) 1.0 (3.2) 3.5 (7.5)
Note: 8 per cent did not answer this question.
Table 12 The parties Beppe Grillo Facebook fans voted for in the
2008 general election
(%)
Italia dei Valori 23.0
Partito Democratico 21.6
Popolo della Liberta 12.9
Lega Nord 5.0
Unione di Centro 1.8
Movimento per l’autonomia 1.3
Other 25.0
Overall, what these data confirm is that, while Grillo and
the M5S seem so far to still be taking more supporters from the
centre-left, former centre-right voters are also moving.
Trust in institutions 
Trust in other people, as well as political and social institutions,
is generally considered to be an important indicator of social
capital in democratic societies. The Italian general public tends
to be relatively untrusting: only the police, army and small and
medium size enterprises commanded the trust of over half of
citizens (results taken from the 2010 and 2011 Eurobarometer
data). However, among Beppe Grillo Facebook fans, levels of
trust are even lower, with some surprising results (table 13). 
Table 13 The extent to which Beppe Grillo Facebook fans trust
institutions, organisations and media outlets54
Institution Tend to trust Tend not to trust
M5S Italian M5S Italian
(%) public (%) public
(%) (%)
Police 31 58 50 34
Army 27 65 52 28
European Union 19 32 62 49
Justice and the legal system 25 42 64 52
Religious institutions 7 48 82 43
Trade unions 11 32 75 56
Government 8 12 86 80
Political parties 3 9 94 84
Big companies 6 33 80 54
The internet 76 37 10 40
TV 4 40 91 49
The radio 23 39 56 40
Parliament 2 14 93 76
SMEs 61 53 20 33
Banks and financial institutions 2 – 92 – 
The UN 21 34 55 46
The press 11 34 83 53
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Consistent with the anti-establishment rhetoric of the M5S
and Grillo, every major political institution fares poorly in the
eyes of Beppe Grillo Facebook fans: less than 20 per cent trust
the EU; only 8 per cent trust the government; 3 per cent trust
political parties; and just 2 per cent trust parliament. Even the
United Nations fares poorly, with only 21 per cent tending to
trust it. The organisations seen as being at the heart of the finan-
cial crisis are especially mistrusted: just 2 per cent trust banks
and financial institutions; and 6 per cent trust big companies. 
However, the two notable exceptions give clear clues to the
motivations for Grillo supporters. First, the only two institutions
that command the trust of over half the respondents are the
internet, with 76 per cent, and small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) with 61 per cent. The internet score is in stark contrast 
to the low levels of trust in other media. Only 11 per cent trust
the press (compared with 34 per cent of Italians overall) and 
less than 4 per cent trust television (compared with 40 per cent
of Italians overall). Given Grillo’s long-running and vehement
criticism of traditional Italian media, these results do not seem
surprising. 
The high trust levels in small and medium sized enterprises
is also of note. These are also generally quite trusted across the
Italian public too. Further research might be useful to
understand these figures, but we would speculate that it is the
‘local’ element of such organisations that could account for this
result. Indeed, other research on trust levels suggest that
personal experience – such as knowing someone inside the
institution – correlates with higher levels of trust and confidence.
As the world becomes more complicated, and institutions more
distant from people’s lives, trust levels fall.55
We also asked respondents about the trust levels they have
in other people (table 14). Trust in other people is generally
considered to be an important indicator of social capital in
democratic societies, and a useful proxy for what is sometimes
called ‘social capital’. In general – taking into account the ‘I
don’t know’ option – levels of generalised trust of Beppe Grillo
Facebook fans are not significantly different from those of the
Italian public overall. In fact, they are slightly above average. 
41
Table 14 The extent to which Beppe Grillo Facebook fans think
that most people can be trusted (national figures in
brackets)56
(%)
Most people cannot be trusted 49 (69)
Most people can be trusted 32 (31)
I don’t know 17 (3)
Although this survey has been conducted at a time of
economic and financial crisis, and in other countries we saw that
economics was among the major concerns that pushed people to
support anti-establishment parties, economics is not among the
main reasons that M5S supporters list when explaining their
support for the M5S (only 2 per cent of our sample refer to
economics as the key reason for supporting Grillo’s Movement)
(table 15).
Table 15 Reasons given by Beppe Grillo Facebook fans for
supporting the M5S
(%)
Disillusioned with the main parties and political system/want change 41 
Adhere to the values of the movement 28 
Movement represents the people 20
Integrity of the leader 6
Economic concerns 2
Rather, most of Grillo’s supporters say that they support
the M5S either as a reaction towards the ‘disillusionment with
main parties/change’ (41 per cent) or because the movement
‘represents the people’ (20 per cent). It seems worth highlighting
that this disenchantment towards traditional politics and
traditional actors is nationally focused (anti-Europeanism does
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not seem to be so important in shaping support). The problems
that drive respondents’ support for the M5S are the Italian
parties and the Italian political system, less so the broader idea of
‘democracy’ and ‘representation’. Indeed, from the possible
answers to the questions we see that Europe is rather conceived
as a ‘good example’, which cannot be followed in Italy because
of the inability of Italian political representatives to do so.
Overall, the support is strictly related to the idea of ‘changing’
the system, the ruling elites and the traditional ways of making
policy. As one respondent says, the M5S represents ‘the hope of a
real change... of a total regeneration and a radical change of the
system in Italy’. 
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About the survey 
The methodology employed in the collection and analysis of our
data is set out in detail in The New Face of Digital Populism57 and
this section offers only a condensed discussion, focused mainly
on issues specific to this particular research project.
Participant recruitment
As in The New Face of Digital Populism we decided to use Facebook
principally because the site is a popular mode of communication
for supporters of Beppe Grillo. We targeted survey adverts to
people who were resident in Italy and members of groups
deemed related to Beppe Grillo. These included Beppe Grillo
News, Movimento 5 Stelle, Movimento cinque stelle, Beppe Grillo, and
Amici de beppe grillo roma.
While we acknowledge that some of those surveyed may be
fans of Grillo in his role as a comedian, we do not believe this
poses a significant problem for the validity of our sample. The
content of his internet output and his public profile over the past
five years overwhelming concern Grillo the political figure, not
Grillo the comedian. As even a cursory glance at his website
www.beppegrillo.it shows, the focus there is on political issues
and the Movimento Cinque Stelle. 
We recruited respondents by placing adverts in Italian on
the right-hand side of the Facebook page. They invited
participants to complete a short survey, and on clicking
redirected them to a digital questionnaire hosted by the Survey
Monkey website. This was entirely in Italian, and began with a
short statement outlining the purpose of the research, providing
a widget allowing users to signify their consent before starting
the survey. If consent was given, users then proceeded through
several pages of questions, concluding with a brief overview of
the research project’s aims and the contact details of the lead
researcher. Table 16 presents a detailed breakdown of completion
rates alongside information on the number of responses and the
size of the sample frame.
Method
Table 16 Data collected for survey on Beppe Grillo 
Date of Specific Size of Total Surveys Surveys Final
survey Facebook popula- Facebook started comple- data
interest tion link clicks ted set
groups reached
targeted
August 2012 7 708,828 4,480 2,245 1,875 1,865
Data analysis 
Weights were employed to increase the external validity of our
results. To do this, we gathered background information on the
composition of the groups used to recruit participants using
Facebook’s advertising tool (which is freely available for any user
to access), and assigned each participant a score value on the
basis of the prevalence of their demographic profile (in this
instance, age and gender). We analysed the data using simple
descriptive statistics, presenting the total occurrence for each
response category in the weighted data set. 
Limitations
Although our use of weights allowed us to achieved some degree
of population representativeness by correcting for systematic age
or gender related bias, it is possible that other biases remain.
Therefore care must be taken when interpreting our results, and
it is with the following caveats that our findings are presented.
Care must be taken when considering the activities and
views of the ‘offline’ Beppe Grillo groups. It cannot be assumed
that those who are members of the online group do not differ
from the offline group, so our findings cannot be claimed to
offer insight into the views and activities of the broader offline
movement. Likewise, our findings cannot be claimed to represent
the ‘official’ views of the group or its leadership, and should not
be represented as such.
Furthermore, the use of social network surveys is subject to
a well-known technical and methodological critique focusing on
the nature of self-entry interest classification and the lack of
content reliability on social networking sites. Therefore it cannot
be claimed that our data illuminate the views or opinions of all
Facebook users who support Beppe Grillo. Rather, our results
offer an insight only into the views of those publicly declared
supporters who formed part of the membership of the Facebook
groups identified above.
It is important to note that as many of the subjects in our
questionnaire are drawn from the Eurobarometer survey,
differences in data collection methodology make it difficult to
compare results. In particular, we believe that Eurobarometer’s
use of face-to-face interviews leads to significant differences in
rates of missing data for questions addressed to sensitive issues.
In our sample, rates of non-response to questions on political
protest were high, whereas the Eurobarometer survey recorded
significantly lower levels of participant non-response. 
It is impossible to infer the true meaning of these refusals;
where non-response was high we sought to identify our
interpretation alongside re-scaled figures presenting just the
responses of those participants who chose to answer. While it is
accepted that this second set of figures may present an imperfect
picture, we offer them by way of speculation as to the ‘true’
distribution of participant responses. We invite the reader to
exercise care in their use and interpretation.
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law or other applicable laws.
3 Licence Grant
Subject to the terms and conditions of this Licence, Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide,
royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual (for the duration of the applicable copyright) licence to
exercise the rights in the Work as stated below: 
A to reproduce the Work, to incorporate the Work into one or more Collective Works, and to
reproduce the Work as incorporated in the Collective Works;
B to distribute copies or phonorecords of, display publicly, perform publicly, and perform
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission the Work including as incorporated in
Collective Works; The above rights may be exercised in all media and formats whether now
known or hereafter devised. The above rights include the right to make such modifications as
are technically necessary to exercise the rights in other media and formats. All rights not
expressly granted by Licensor are hereby reserved.
4 Restrictions
The licence granted in Section 3 above is expressly made subject to and limited by the
following restrictions:
A You may distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work
only under the terms of this Licence, and You must include a copy of, or the Uniform
Resource Identifier for, this Licence with every copy or phonorecord of the Work You
distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform. You may not offer or
impose any terms on the Work that alter or restrict the terms of this Licence or the recipients’
exercise of the rights granted here under. You may not sublicence the Work. You must keep
intact all notices that refer to this Licence and to the disclaimer of warranties. You may not
distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work with any
technological measures that control access or use of the Work in a manner inconsistent with
the terms of this Licence Agreement. The above applies to the Work as incorporated in a
Collective Work, but this does not require the Collective Work apart from the Work itself to
be made subject to the terms of this Licence. If You create a Collective Work, upon notice
from any Licensor You must, to the extent practicable, remove from the Collective Work any
reference to such Licensor or the Original Author, as requested.
B You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in Section 3 above in any manner that
is primarily intended for or directed towards commercial advantage or private monetary
Licence to Publish
compensation. The exchange of the Work for other copyrighted works by means of digital
filesharing or otherwise shall not be considered to be intended for or directed towards
commercial advantage or private monetary compensation, provided there is no payment of
any monetary compensation in connection with the exchange of copyrighted works.
C If you distribute, publicly display, publicly perform, or publicly digitally perform the Work or
any Collective Works, You must keep intact all copyright notices for the Work and give the
Original Author credit reasonable to the medium or means You are utilising by conveying the
name (or pseudonym if applicable) of the Original Author if supplied; the title of the Work if
supplied. Such credit may be implemented in any reasonable manner; provided, however, that
in the case of a Collective Work, at a minimum such credit will appear where any other
comparable authorship credit appears and in a manner at least as prominent as such other
comparable authorship credit.
5 Representations, Warranties and Disclaimer
A By offering the Work for public release under this Licence, Licensor represents and warrants
that, to the best of Licensor’s knowledge after reasonable inquiry:
i Licensor has secured all rights in the Work necessary to grant the licence rights hereunder
and to permit the lawful exercise of the rights granted hereunder without You having any
obligation to pay any royalties, compulsory licence fees, residuals or any other payments;
ii The Work does not infringe the copyright, trademark, publicity rights, common law rights or
any other right of any third party or constitute defamation, invasion of privacy or other
tortious injury to any third party.
B except as expressly stated in this licence or otherwise agreed in writing or required by
applicable law, the work is licenced on an ‘as is’ basis, without warranties of any kind, either
express or implied including, without limitation, any warranties regarding the contents or
accuracy of the work.
6 Limitation on Liability
Except to the extent required by applicable law, and except for damages arising from liability
to a third party resulting from breach of the warranties in section 5, in no event will Licensor
be liable to you on any legal theory for any special, incidental, consequential, punitive or
exemplary damages arising out of this licence or the use of the work, even if Licensor has
been advised of the possibility of such damages.
7 Termination
A This Licence and the rights granted hereunder will terminate automatically upon any breach
by You of the terms of this Licence. Individuals or entities who have received Collective
Works from You under this Licence, however, will not have their licences terminated provided
such individuals or entities remain in full compliance with those licences. Sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 7,
and 8 will survive any termination of this Licence.
B Subject to the above terms and conditions, the licence granted here is perpetual (for the
duration of the applicable copyright in the Work). Notwithstanding the above, Licensor
reserves the right to release the Work under different licence terms or to stop distributing the
Work at any time; provided, however that any such election will not serve to withdraw this
Licence (or any other licence that has been, or is required to be, granted under the terms of
this Licence), and this Licence will continue in full force and effect unless terminated as stated
above.
8 Miscellaneous
A Each time You distribute or publicly digitally perform the Work or a Collective Work, Demos
offers to the recipient a licence to the Work on the same terms and conditions as the licence
granted to You under this Licence.
B If any provision of this Licence is invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, it shall not
affect the validity or enforceability of the remainder of the terms of this Licence, and without
further action by the parties to this agreement, such provision shall be reformed to the
minimum extent necessary to make such provision valid and enforceable.
C No term or provision of this Licence shall be deemed waived and no breach consented to
unless such waiver or consent shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged with
such waiver or consent.
D This Licence constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the Work
licenced here. There are no understandings, agreements or representations with respect to
the Work not specified here. Licensor shall not be bound by any additional provisions that
may appear in any communication from You. This Licence may not be modified without the
mutual written agreement of Demos and You.
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“Social media is
changing politics 
across Europe…”
NEW POLITICAL ACTORS IN
EUROPE: BEPPE GRILLO
AND THE M5S
Jamie Bartlett
Caterina Froio
Mark Littler
Duncan McDonnell
New social and political movements from radically different
political positions are emerging across Europe using social
media, posing a new challenge to existing political parties
and structures. The Pirate Party in Germany and the Occupy
movement are examples of movements that have employed
social media to grow rapidly and create a significant political
and social impact – all in the last three years.
Beppe Grillo, the Italian comedian and blogger, is one 
of the first political figures to have embraced this change. 
He has used social media to communicate, recruit and
organise, growing the Moviment 5 Stelle from practically
nothing to a major political force in Italy in the space of 
three years, with it expected to play a crucial role in the 2013
Italian elections. His anti-establishment message has
resonated with many against a backdrop of declining trust in
political institutions, falling political party membership and
ever-lower voter turnout.
This report presents the results of a survey of 1,865
Facebook fans of Beppe Grillo and the Movimento 5 
Stelle. It includes data on who they are, what they think, 
and what motivates them to shift from virtual to real-world
activism. It also compares them with other similar parties in
Western Europe and their attitudes to those of the Italian
population. This report is the seventh in a series of country
specific briefings about the online support of populist 
parties across Europe.
Jamie Bartlett is Director of the Centre for the Analysis of
Social Media. Caterina Froio is a researcher at the European
University Institute, Florence. Mark Littler is an Associate of
Demos. Duncan McDonnell is a Marie Curie Fellow in the
Department of Political and Social Sciences at the European
University Institute, Florence.
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